

**FILED**

MAY - 9 2022

*Alison A. Johnson*  
CLERK OF COURT

**EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT  
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

**ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER REGARDING  
DEPOSITION BEHAVIOR**

Administrative Order: 22-08

This Administrative Order Regarding Deposition Behavior (“Order”) applies to all civil and family division actions filed in the Eighth Judicial District Court (“the Court” or “this District”) for which discovery disputes are heard by a discovery commissioner or discovery hearing master. The Court enters this Order in furtherance of its duty to “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”<sup>1</sup>

All counsel intending to participate in depositions, and witnesses expecting to testify at trial, must comply with this Order. Counsel must behave professionally at all times during depositions; they must treat parties, other counsel, court reporters, videographers, interpreters, and others involved in any aspect of a deposition with civility and respect.<sup>2</sup>

**I. SCHEDULING**

Counsel must cooperate with each other, demonstrating civility and respect when scheduling a deposition. In fact, it is counsel’s ethical duty to do so.<sup>3</sup> Counsel must make reasonable efforts to ascertain and accommodate the availability of the witnesses and all counsel both before and after noticing the deposition. If the date proposed in a deposition notice is problematic for counsel or the witness, any person with a scheduling conflict must promptly propose several reasonable alternative dates. Failure by counsel and/or a witness to promptly and reasonably advise noticing counsel of their availability or to provide alternative

1  
2 **EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT**  
3 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

4  
5 **ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER REGARDING**  
6 **DEPOSITION BEHAVIOR**

Administrative Order: 22-08

7  
8 This Administrative Order Regarding Deposition Behavior (“Order”) applies to all civil  
9 and family division actions filed in the Eighth Judicial District Court (“the Court” or “this  
10 District”) for which discovery disputes are heard by a discovery commissioner or discovery  
11 hearing master. The Court enters this Order in furtherance of its duty to “secure the just,  
12 speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”<sup>1</sup>

13  
14 All counsel intending to participate in depositions, and witnesses expecting to testify at  
15 trial, must comply with this Order. Counsel must behave professionally at all times during  
16 depositions; they must treat parties, other counsel, court reporters, videographers, interpreters,  
17 and others involved in any aspect of a deposition with civility and respect.<sup>2</sup>

18  
19 **I. SCHEDULING**

20  
21 Counsel must cooperate with each other, demonstrating civility and respect when  
22 scheduling a deposition. In fact, it is counsel’s ethical duty to do so.<sup>3</sup> Counsel must make  
23 reasonable efforts to ascertain and accommodate the availability of the witnesses and all  
24 counsel both before and after noticing the deposition. If the date proposed in a deposition  
25 notice is problematic for counsel or the witness, any person with a scheduling conflict must  
26 promptly propose several reasonable alternative dates. Failure by counsel and/or a witness to  
27 promptly and reasonably advise noticing counsel of their availability or to provide alternative  
28

1 dates acts as a waiver of their right to object to the date set by deposing counsel. Likewise, all  
2 counsel must reasonably cooperate with a witness or opposing counsel who may need to  
3 postpone a deposition for personal or professional reasons after an original date is set unless  
4 doing so would adversely affect a party's rights.  
5

## 6 **II. EXAMINATION OF THE WITNESS BY COUNSEL**

### 7 **A. Examination Should Proceed as if at Trial**

8  
9 NRCP 30(c)(1)'s requirement that the "examination and cross-examination of a  
10 deponent proceed as they would at trial" shall serve as a reminder to all counsel to behave at a  
11 deposition as if they were in the presence of a judicial officer or under the watchful eyes of a  
12 jury.<sup>4</sup> Like all discovery rules, Rule 30 is intended to be self-executing—that is, counsel are  
13 bound by operation of the Rule "to depose witnesses 'as they would at trial' without judicial  
14 assistance, oversight, or intervention," and are "expected to police their own behavior and  
15 examination tactics during depositions."<sup>5</sup>  
16

### 17 **B. Duration and Location of Examination**

18  
19 Absent an agreement or order, depositions must take place on weekdays during normal  
20 business hours. While the presumptive durational limit of "1 day of 7 hours of testimony"  
21 applies to depositions in this District, the "'7 hours of testimony' specified in Rule 30(d)(1)  
22 means 7 hours [of time] on the record. The time taken for convenience breaks, recess for a  
23 meal, or an adjournment under Rule 30(d)(3) does not count as deposition time."<sup>6</sup>  
24

25  
26 Counsel must cooperate regarding the allocation of examination time between  
27 attorneys, especially where the case involves multiple parties or the deposition is of a third  
28 party. Further, "[p]reoccupation with [the amount of] tim[e] [examining a witness on the  
record] is to be avoided."<sup>7</sup> Counsel shall reasonably cooperate to extend the duration of a

1 deposition where the complexity or breadth of the matters on which the witness is examined,  
2 the number of parties, or fairness requires.

3 Normally, a deposition will take place in person. The parties may stipulate, and the  
4 Court may order for good cause shown, that a deposition “be taken by telephone or other  
5 [including video] remote means.”<sup>8</sup> Examining counsel may generally set the deposition for an  
6 appropriate location of their choosing subject to the Court’s power to grant a protective order.<sup>9</sup>  
7

8 Generally, a plaintiff’s deposition may be taken in this District; a defendant’s deposition  
9 may be taken where the defendant resides or, in the case of a corporate defendant’s Rule  
10 30(b)(6) designee, where the corporation has its principal place of business.<sup>10</sup> A defendant who  
11 is also a counterclaimant will be treated the same as a plaintiff for purposes of deciding the  
12 location of defendant/counterclaimant’s deposition. Nevertheless, a witness should not have to  
13 travel for a deposition absent good cause.<sup>11</sup> The Nevada Supreme Court in *Okada v. Eighth*  
14 *Jud. Dist. Ct.* held that courts must consider “cost, convenience[,] and litigation efficiency,” as  
15 well as the following five factors when determining whether good cause exists to protect a  
16 deponent from having to testify in the location noticed by another party:  
17  
18

- 19 (1) the location of counsel for the parties in the forum district; (2) the number of  
20 corporate representatives a party is seeking to depose; (3) the likelihood of  
21 significant discovery disputes arising, which would necessitate resolution by the  
22 forum court; (4) whether the persons sought to be deposed often engage in travel  
23 for business purposes; and (5) the equities with regard to the nature of the claim  
24 and the parties’ relationship.<sup>12</sup>

### 23 **C. Limitations on the Examination**

24 Counsel may generally seek testimony on “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to  
25 any party’s claims or defenses and proportional to the needs of the case.”<sup>13</sup> Counsel may not  
26 conduct a deposition “in bad faith or in a manner that unreasonably annoys, embarrasses, or  
27 oppresses the deponent”<sup>14</sup> or in a way that “impedes, delays, or frustrates the fair examination  
28

1 of the deponent.”<sup>15</sup>

2 Counsel shall refrain from overly aggressive, repetitive, or argumentative questions or  
3 those asked for the purpose of intimidating a witness. Counsel may not purposefully mislead  
4 the witness or attempt to trick the witness, including by mischaracterizing prior testimony.  
5 Such behavior is not permitted in the presence of a judicial officer and is likewise not permitted  
6 during a deposition. Further, the examiner must not interrupt a witness who is answering a  
7 question. A witness, or counsel representing the witness, may insist the witness be allowed to  
8 complete an answer before fielding another question.  
9  
10

11 **D. Treatment of Documents**

12 Examining counsel shall provide all counsel/self-represented parties with a copy of all  
13 documents shown to the deponent. During a deposition taken remotely or by audio/visual  
14 means, the examiner must contemporaneously provide all participants with electronic copies of  
15 any document used at the deposition. Further, the examiner must display a document on the  
16 video feed during a remote video deposition while questioning the witness about the document.  
17

18 1. Prior Disclosure of Documents for Use at Deposition

19 Fairness to opposing counsel,<sup>16</sup> as well as compliance with NRCP 16.1, requires that  
20 any document that is to be referred to, utilized, or attached as an exhibit during a deposition  
21 must be disclosed *prior* to the deposition.<sup>17</sup> Rule 16.1 (a)(1)(A)(ii)<sup>18</sup> requires disclosure of  
22

23 . . . all documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things that the  
24 disclosing party has in its possession, custody, or control and may use to support  
25 its claims or defenses, including for impeachment or rebuttal, and, unless  
26 privileged or protected from disclosure, any record, report, or witness statement,  
27 in any form, concerning the incident that gives rise to the lawsuit.  
28

///  
27

1 Rule 16.1(a)(1)(C) mandates that initial disclosures must be made within 14 days after  
2 the parties' early case conference – or Rule 16.1(b) conference – unless a different time is  
3 ordered by the court or agreed to by the parties. Parties who join after the initial Rule 16.1(b)  
4 conference are given 30 days after filing of their answer – or Rule 12 motion – to make their  
5 disclosures.  
6

7 It is important to note that a party “must make its initial disclosures based on the  
8 information then reasonably available to it.” NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(E). Fairness to opposing  
9 counsel requires that seasonal supplements be made and that the disclosure allows adequate  
10 time for counsel to review and prepare with clients before depositions begin.  
11

12 Disclosing a document for the first time in a deposition constitutes gamesmanship and  
13 may warrant sanctions. Put simply, gamesmanship includes any attempt to gain competitive  
14 advantage by either an artful manipulation of the rules, untimely or nondisclosure of  
15 information, or outright deception. Litigants “should not indulge in gamesmanship with respect  
16 to the disclosure obligations.”<sup>19</sup>  
17

18 Gamesmanship violates NRPC 3.4(a), which provides:

19 A lawyer shall not:

20 (a) Unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter,  
21 destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary  
22 value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act;

23 There is no room for gamesmanship in the discovery process. It is antithetical to the  
24 purpose of discovery and unethical. Manipulation of the discovery rules frustrates the entire  
25 process, “because one of ‘[t]he purpose[s] of discovery is to remove surprise from trial  
26 preparation so the parties can obtain evidence necessary to evaluate and resolve their dispute.’  
27

28 ///

1 Thus, “[o]pen discovery is the norm [and] *gamesmanship with information is discouraged and*  
2 *surprises are abhorred.*”<sup>20</sup>

3 The Ninth Circuit’s decision in *Haeger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co* clearly set forth  
4 why courts are intolerant of gamesmanship in the discovery process. It cites the lower court’s  
5 underlying decision, noting:  
6

7 Litigation is not a game. It is the time - honored method of seeking the truth,  
8 finding the truth, and doing justice. When a corporation and its counsel refuse to  
9 produce directly relevant information an opposing party is entitled to receive,  
10 they have abandoned these basic principles in favor of their own interests.[] The  
11 little voice in every attorney’s conscience that murmurs turn over all material  
12 information was ignored.<sup>21</sup>

13 Fairness to counsel and compliance with the discovery rules is the only way to ethically  
14 litigate. Gamesmanship has no place in depositions; it will result in sanctions.

## 15 2. Seeking Documents Through Deposition Notice or Subpoena

16 A party *may not* attempt to circumvent NRCP 34’s 30-day deadline for requiring  
17 another party to disclose documents by instead seeking them via subpoena. *A Rule 34 request*  
18 *is the proper procedure to seek production of documents from a party to a lawsuit.*<sup>22</sup> Pursuant  
19 to NRCP 45(a)(1), a subpoena may only be used to command a *nonparty* to produce designated  
20 documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things in that person’s possession,  
21 custody, or control; or to permit the inspection of premises.<sup>23</sup>

22 NRCP 45(a)(4)(A) requires at least 7 days’ notice to the other parties to the litigation  
23 before a subpoena may be served on the person to whom or entity to which it is directed. The  
24 advanced notice allows parties to the litigation the opportunity to file a timely objection and a  
25 motion for a protective order to prevent the disclosure of privileged, confidential, or other  
26 protected matter.<sup>24</sup> A party may only object on behalf of itself; it may not object on behalf of  
27 another.  
28

1 To seek protection under Rule 45(a)(4)(B), the objecting party must “file and serve  
2 written objections to the subpoena and a motion for a protective order under Rule 26(c) within  
3 7 days after being served with notice and a copy of the subpoena under Rule 45(a)(4)(A).<sup>25</sup> In  
4 both the objection and the motion, the party must 1) specifically state the party’s objections to  
5 each command for production or inspection; and 2) demonstrate the basis for asserting the  
6 command will require disclosure of “privileged, confidential, or other protected matter and  
7 establish that no exception or waiver applies and that the objecting party is entitled to assert the  
8 claim of privilege or other protection against disclosure.”<sup>26</sup> An objection and motion filed on  
9 these grounds acts to stay service of the subpoena until the court rules on the objection and  
10 motion.<sup>27</sup>

13 Any objection or motion for protective order *not* based on privilege, confidentiality or  
14 other recognized protection from disclosure – i.e. the work product doctrine – does not  
15 automatically stay service of the subpoena. In those instances, the objecting party must apply  
16 to the court for relief under Rule 26(c).<sup>28</sup>

#### 18 **E. Coaching the Witness**

19 A witness at trial may not request a break to be coached by counsel;<sup>29</sup> the same rule  
20 applies to a deposition. If a break is necessary, special care should be taken to maintain the  
21 attorney-client privilege. The Nevada Supreme Court in *Coyote Springs Investment v. Eighth*  
22 *Jud. Dist. Ct.*<sup>30</sup> held that one “may not request a break to confer with witnesses in a discovery  
23 deposition unless the purpose of the break is to determine whether to assert a privilege.”<sup>31</sup> An  
24 attorney may communicate with a witness during an unrequested break or recess.<sup>32</sup>

25 If a “private conference” is required to determine whether to assert a privilege, the  
26 witness’ attorney must place the following on the record when the deposition resumes: 1) the  
27  
28

1 fact that a conference took place; 2) the subject of the conference; and 3) the result of the  
2 conference—the decision whether to assert a privilege.<sup>33</sup> Any discussion on other topics waives  
3 the attorney-client privilege as to that portion of the conference.<sup>34</sup>  
4

### 5 **III. WITNESS CONDUCT DURING DEPOSITIONS**

6 Witnesses must give direct answers to straightforward questions. The Court will treat  
7 evasive deposition testimony as a failure, if not a refusal, to testify.<sup>35</sup> The Court treats  
8 inappropriate behavior from all witnesses on an equal footing.  
9

10 All witnesses, including expert witnesses, are subject to the same rule: “an evasive or  
11 incomplete disclosure, answer, or response must be treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or  
12 respond.”<sup>36</sup> Some expert witnesses and Rule 30(b)(6) designees seem to operate under the  
13 misguided belief that their position as a subject matter expert renders them exempt from the  
14 requirement to participate in depositions without “imped[ing], delay[ing], or frustrate[ing] the  
15 fair examination of the deponent.”<sup>37</sup> Expert and fact witnesses alike must permit a fair  
16 examination and must participate in discovery in good faith. An expert witness who fails to  
17 obey this Order may be subject to being stricken as an expert witness.  
18  
19

20 The following non-exhaustive list of inappropriate behaviors by a testifying witness, are  
21 tantamount to failure, if not a refusal, to testify:<sup>38</sup> 1) repeated failure or refusal to give direct  
22 answers to straightforward questions; 2) non-responsive narratives designed to filibuster; 3)  
23 refusal to give estimates so as to avoid giving meaningful testimony; 4) impertinent statements;  
24 and 5) feigning lack of knowledge by providing “I don’t know” responses so as to avoid  
25 answering questions.<sup>39</sup>  
26

27 Personal sanctions against the witness, party, and/or any counsel who facilitate or  
28 encourage a witness to impede a fair examination (or counsel who fail to instruct a witness on

1 the record to cease such behavior) may be appropriate. The Court may also compel further  
2 testimony when a deponent fails to answer a question asked or otherwise frustrates a fair  
3 examination.<sup>40</sup>

4  
5 A party who violates this Order risks not only the trier of fact taking their evasiveness  
6 as a lack of veracity, but also the imposition of the most severe discovery sanctions available.  
7 NRCP 37(d)(3) and NRCP 37(b)(1) allow the Court to: 1) require the party failing to act, the  
8 attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees,  
9 caused by the failure; 2) direct that the matters embraced in the order or other designated facts  
10 be taken as established for purposes of the action, as the prevailing party claims; 3) prohibit the  
11 disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses, or from  
12 introducing designated matters in evidence; 4) strike pleadings in whole or in part; 5) stay  
13 further proceedings until the order is obeyed; 6) dismiss the action or proceeding in whole or in  
14 part; 7) render a default judgment against the disobedient party; and/or 8) treat as contempt of  
15 court the failure to obey any order except an order to submit to a physical or mental  
16 examination.  
17  
18

#### 19 **IV. LODGING OBJECTIONS**

##### 20 **A. Objections Preserved for Trial**

21 Under normal circumstances, an attorney defending a deposition is rarely faced with the  
22 need or opportunity to lodge an objection. All objections dealing with the admissibility of a  
23 witness' testimony are preserved for trial and are not to be made at the deposition.<sup>41</sup> Except as  
24 further discussed below, the only need for an objection during a deposition is to address the  
25 *form* of the question itself, not the testimony it elicits or the subject matter of the question.<sup>42</sup>  
26  
27  
28

1 All deposition objections are preserved for trial except to: 1) assert a privilege;<sup>43</sup> 2)  
2 enforce a limitation ordered by a court;<sup>44</sup> 3) present a motion under Rule 30(d)(3);<sup>45</sup> 4) object  
3 to a party's conduct;<sup>46</sup> 5) object to the lack of foundation;<sup>47</sup> or 6) to object to the form of the  
4 question where the objection would be waived if not made.<sup>48</sup> Objections to the form of the  
5 question are waived if not timely made.<sup>49</sup> It is improper to impede the fair examination of a  
6 witness by lodging preserved objections at a deposition.  
7

8 **B. Objecting to the Form of the Question**

9 Objecting to the form of the question allows the examiner an opportunity to cure the  
10 question's deficiency while at the deposition—because it cannot be cured while being read at  
11 trial.<sup>50</sup> NRCPC 30(d)(1) requires “an objection must be stated concisely, and in a non-  
12 argumentative and non-suggestive manner.”  
13

14 There is much debate regarding the appropriate way to lodge an objection during a  
15 deposition. If the objecting party merely states “object to the form of the question,”<sup>51</sup> the  
16 objection does not provide sufficient information to inform the examiner of the defect in the  
17 question which needs to be cured, preventing the seasonable curing of the objectionable part.<sup>52</sup>  
18 This, in turn, invites a colloquy between counsel regarding exactly how the form of the  
19 question might be inappropriate. All too often, the colloquy ends in unnecessary disagreement.  
20 Nevertheless, as this is the examiner's opportunity to cure any defect, objecting counsel must  
21 concisely state the nature of the defect without argument if asked to explain the basis for the  
22 objection.  
23  
24

25 In this District, form objections are limited to stating: 1) that the form of the question is  
26 objectionable; and 2) identifying the specific way the form is objectionable, *i.e.* that it calls for  
27 speculation. Any discussion beyond these basics is both an inappropriate “speaking objection”  
28

1 and may subject counsel to sanctions because it is tantamount to coaching the witness.<sup>53</sup> For  
2 example, interjecting a long-winded explanation of the question’s deficiency is improper. The  
3 following are examples of inappropriate objections:

4           *Example:* “Objection, vague and ambiguous. Counsel, what period are you asking  
5 about? If you are asking about 2019, the witness would have no knowledge.”

6           *Example:* “Calls for speculation. The witness can’t possibly know what Mr. Y was  
7 thinking. You are asking him to guess.”

8           The following are *appropriate* deposition form objections in this District:

- 9           1.       Objection to the form of the question—Ambiguous;<sup>54</sup>
- 10           2.       Objection to the form of the question—Vague or unintelligible;<sup>55</sup>
- 11           3.       Objection to the form of the question—Argumentative;<sup>56</sup>
- 12           4.       Objection to the form of the question—Calls for a narrative;<sup>57</sup>
- 13           5.       Objection to the form of the question—Calls for speculation;<sup>58</sup>
- 14           6.       Objection to the form of the question—Compound;<sup>59</sup>
- 15           7.       Objection to the form of the question—Leading;<sup>60</sup>
- 16           8.       Objection to the form of the question—Mischaracterizes/Misstates the witness’  
17 prior testimony;<sup>61</sup> and
- 18           9.       Objection to the form of the question—Mischaracterizes/Misstates the  
19 evidence.<sup>62</sup>

### 20           **C.       Obstructionist Behavior**

21           Counsel must resist the urge to engage in string objections, coupling multiple specific  
22 objections together. String objections, such as “objection to the form of the question—lacks  
23 foundation, compound, calls for speculation, legal conclusion, document speaks for itself, and  
24 seeks information that is not proportional to the needs of the case” are generally not appropriate  
25 and must be avoided.

26           Objections to “relevancy,”<sup>63</sup> “hearsay,”<sup>64</sup> “asked and answered,”<sup>65</sup> “best evidence,”<sup>66</sup>  
27 “the document speaks for itself,”<sup>67</sup> and “assumes facts not in evidence”<sup>68</sup> do not go to the form  
28 of the question and are, therefore, improper unless asserted for the purpose of making a record

1 of abusive behavior. Making these types of improper objections may result in personal  
2 sanctions against objecting counsel for discovery abuse.<sup>69</sup>

3  
4 Courts in this District have consistently ruled that coaching a witness through improper  
5 deposition objections is not permitted and may be sanctionable.<sup>70</sup> Counsel must not coach the  
6 witness by interpreting questions (for example, “What counsel is trying to ask is . . .”), deciding  
7 what questions the witness will answer, or helping the witness answer questions.<sup>71</sup> “Objection  
8 to the form. Foundation. Mischaracterizes his prior testimony. The witness said ‘X’ not ‘Y’”  
9 is an example of this type of inappropriate objection.  
10

11 One discovery commissioner wrote:

12 [C]oaching of the witnesses and general interruptions in the deposition  
13 procedure cannot be tolerated; constant objections and gratuitous remarks  
14 contaminate the deposition proceeding, depriving counsel of the right to a fair  
15 examination; comments by the non-deposing attorney such as ‘if you  
16 remember,’ ‘if you know,’ ‘do you understand the question,’ ‘you’ve answered  
17 the question,’ ‘he wants to know,’ ‘if he has recollection,’ ‘don’t speculate’ or  
18 ‘don’t guess’ are improper.<sup>72</sup>

19 U.S. Magistrate Judge Leen once suggested to the prominent attorneys appearing in  
20 front of her for discovery abuse that they should be aware of the following elemental discovery  
21 rules that are enforced in this District as well:

22 If I was an elementary school teacher instead of a judge I would require both  
23 counsel to write the following clearly established legal rules on a blackboard  
24 500 times:

25 I will not make speaking, coaching, suggestive objections which violate Rule  
26 30(c)(2). I am an experienced lawyer and know that objections must be concise,  
27 nonargumentative and non-suggestive. I understand that the purpose of a  
28 deposition is to find out what the witness thinks, saw, heard or did. I know that  
lawyers are not supposed to coach or change the witness’s own words to form a  
legally convenient record. I know I am prohibited from frustrating or impeding  
the fair examination of a deponent during the deposition. I know that constant  
objections and unnecessary remarks are unwarranted and frustrate opposing  
counsel's right to fair examination. I know that speaking objections such as “if  
you remember,” “if you know,” “don't guess,” “you’ve answered the question,”

1 and “do you understand the question” are designed to coach the witness and are  
2 improper. I also know that counsel's interjection that he or she does not  
3 understand the question is not a proper objection, and that if a witness needs  
clarification of a question, the witness may ask for the clarification.<sup>73</sup>

4 This Court further agrees with U.S. Magistrate Judge Seeger, who suggested “[i]t is  
5 unsurprising that witnesses typically testify that they can’t remember after they hear ‘if you  
6 remember.’ And they almost always say that they don’t know after counsel blurts out ‘if you  
7 know.’ Such coaching-by-thinly-veiled-instruction violates [the law].”<sup>74</sup>

8  
9 In addition to coaching, other obstructionist behavior during a deposition includes: 1)  
10 frequently objecting as a means to harass the deponent or opposing counsel;<sup>75</sup> 2) objecting with  
11 the purpose of interrupting the flow of the deposition;<sup>76</sup> 3) instructing a witness not to answer  
12 for *any reason* other than as allowed by the NRCPP or as stated herein;<sup>77</sup> 4) making intimidating  
13 or rude comments;<sup>78</sup> and 5) arguing between counsel in front of the witness.<sup>79</sup> Engaging in any  
14 obstructionist behavior that “impedes, delays, or frustrates the fair examination of the  
15 deponent,” invites the Court to sanction objecting counsel.<sup>80</sup>

16  
17 Counsel may seek limited reasonable clarifications without violating this Order. As one  
18 court suggested:

19  
20 Sometimes questions are generally unclear and a modest clarification can clear  
21 things up. For example, it is acceptable to ask the questioning attorney to clarify  
22 what month or year he or she is asking about (if the time period matters),  
23 especially when the questioning attorney moves back and forth between  
24 different time periods. As a second example, asking the questioning attorney to  
25 clarify who “he,” “she,” or “they” refer to is acceptable, too. As a final  
26 example, it is acceptable to ask the questioning attorney about the origin or  
27 completeness of an exhibit if, for example, it: (1) lacks a bates number; (2) is  
28 missing an attachment; (3) appears to be an improper compilation of different  
documents; or (4) otherwise appears improper, incomplete, or over-inclusive.  
Such requests for clarification must be unobtrusive, in good faith, and  
(hopefully) rare.<sup>81</sup>

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

**D. Instructing a Witness not to Answer**

“A person may instruct a deponent not to answer only when necessary to preserve a privilege, to enforce a limitation ordered by the court, or to present a motion under Rule 30(d)(3).”<sup>82</sup> When counsel instructs a witness not to answer a question, examiners often terminate the deposition without finishing and seek a protective order. The best practice is to: 1) preserve the issue regarding the instruction on the record for later resolution by the parties or the Court; and 2) finish the examination as to all other topics before suspending or terminating the deposition for the purpose of seeking protection from the Court.

**V. RULE 30(B)(6) DEPOSITIONS**

**A. Taking the Deposition of an Entity**

NRCP Rule 30(b)(6) allows the deposition of any “public or private corporation, a partnership, an association, a governmental agency, or other entity.” Because an entity cannot speak for itself, the law requires that the entity designate a spokesperson or spokespersons whose testimony will “represent[] the knowledge of the corporation” and bind the entity by their answers.<sup>83</sup>

**B. Identifying the Topic(s) and the Designee(s)**

Rule 30(b)(6) imposes burdens on both the discovering party and the designating party.<sup>84</sup> The notice of taking deposition (or subpoena for a non-party) “must describe with reasonable particularity the matters for examination.”<sup>85</sup> Although there is no limit to either the number or breadth of the topics permitted under Rule 30(b)(6), noticing counsel must be guided by Rule 26(b)(1)’s proportionality factors and by Rule 26(g)’s certification requirement.

///

1 “The reasonableness of the length and scope of a deposition notice turns on the circumstances  
2 of each case.”<sup>86</sup> Protection is available under Rule 26(c)(1) for notices that are disproportionate  
3 to the needs of the case.

4  
5 Parties who object to the number or description of topics for examination must confer in  
6 good faith promptly upon the service of the subpoena or notice to “facilitate[] collaborative  
7 efforts to achieve the proportionality goals [of the Rules].”<sup>87</sup> Parties who designate a  
8 disproportional number of topics—including for the purpose of burdening the responding  
9 party—may be subject to sanctions.<sup>88</sup>

10  
11 The requesting party must designate the areas of inquiry with “painstaking specificity”  
12 such that they reasonably put the entity on notice of the subject matter of anticipated questions,  
13 as the entity must educate its designee(s) concerning the noticed topics.<sup>89</sup> Where the  
14 responding party cannot identify the outer limits of areas of inquiry, compliant designation and  
15 preparation is not feasible; therefore the notice is not sufficiently specific.<sup>90</sup> Further, the  
16 noticed topic areas of inquiry are the “minimum” about which the designated representative  
17 must speak, not the “maximum”.<sup>91</sup>

### 18 19 **C. The Myth of the “PMK” Deposition**

20 Some practitioners inaccurately refer to a Rule 30(b)(6) entity deposition as a deposition  
21 of the “PMK” or “Person Most Knowledgeable”. There is no such type of deposition  
22 recognized under the NRCP *for the purpose of binding the entity*. Nor is a party entitled to  
23 force the entity to produce its “Person Most Knowledgeable” under Rule 30(b)(6).<sup>92</sup> The entity  
24 chooses its own designee and is not forced to provide the person with the most personal or first-  
25 hand knowledge—the “named organization must then designate one or more officers, directors,  
26

1 or managing agents, or designate other persons who consent to testify on its behalf.”<sup>93</sup> The  
2 entity must only prepare the designee and be willing to be bound by the designee’s testimony.

3 **D. The Entity’s Obligation to Educate and Prepare a Witness**

4 The designee need not have *personal knowledge* on any topic presented, but the entity  
5 has an affirmative duty to “make a conscientious, good-faith effort to designate knowledgeable  
6 persons for Rule 30(b)(6) depositions and to prepare them to fully and unequivocally answer  
7 questions about the designated subject matter.”<sup>94</sup> In other words, the entity may name its CEO  
8 or its janitor as its designee as long as it fully educates the individual on the topics and is  
9 willing to be bound by testimony that “represents the knowledge of the corporation, not the  
10 individual deponent’s.”<sup>95</sup>

11 The entity is obligated to prepare any designee to testify: 1) beyond matters personally  
12 known to the witness or to matters in which the designated witness was personally involved; 2)  
13 on matters reasonably known by the responding party; 3) to the extent matters are reasonably  
14 available, whether from documents, past employees, past owners, or other sources; and 4) by  
15 having the designee review prior fact witness deposition testimony as well as documents and  
16 deposition exhibits.<sup>96</sup>

17 Although adequately preparing witness for a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition can be  
18 burdensome, “this is merely the result of the concomitant obligation from the privilege of being  
19 able to use the corporate form in order to conduct business.”<sup>97</sup> Further, if it becomes apparent  
20 during the deposition that the designee is unable to respond to relevant and properly-noticed  
21 areas of inquiry, the responding party has a duty to designate an additional knowledgeable  
22 deponent. Failure to produce a Rule 30(b)(6) designee who is adequately educated and  
23

1 prepared to testify on adequately-designated topics is tantamount to a nonappearance which  
2 could warrant the imposition of sanctions.<sup>98</sup>

3 If an entity designates more than one spokesperson under Rule 30(b)(6), the designees  
4 collectively count as one deposition toward the presumptive maximum of ten depositions per  
5 side.<sup>99</sup> While an entity is at liberty to designate as many spokespersons as it deems necessary,  
6 “for purposes of this *durational limit*, the deposition of *each person* designated under Rule  
7 30(b)(6) should be considered a separate deposition.”<sup>100</sup> In other words, the deposing party  
8 may depose *each* designee for up to 7 hours in 1 day, subject to a protective order where  
9 appropriate.  
10  
11

12 **E. Objecting to the Rule 30(b)(6) Notice**

13 The entity receiving a Rule 30(b)(6) notice may object to topics outlined in a Rule  
14 30(b)(6) notice, but the entity must also seek and obtain a protective order from the Court  
15 before going forward with the deposition.<sup>101</sup> Moreover, the filing of a motion does not relieve  
16 an entity from appearing and testifying at a deposition—that obligation is only relieved by  
17 obtaining a protective order.<sup>102</sup> Cooperative, civil counsel will postpone a deposition pending  
18 the decision on a motion for protective order unless doing so would adversely affect their  
19 client’s rights.  
20  
21

22 **F. Questions Beyond the Scope of the Notice**

23 When a designee is asked questions beyond the scope of the noticed topics, counsel  
24 may not instruct the deponent not to answer,<sup>103</sup> but may note on the record that because the  
25 question goes beyond the scope of the notice, the answers will not bind the entity.<sup>104</sup>  
26

27 ///

28 ///

1 **VI. SEEKING COURT INTERVENTION**

2 **A. Court Intervention *After Exhausting all Other Alternatives***

3 The Court expects counsel to act consistent with this Order. When opinions differ  
4 regarding the propriety of a question or behavior, counsel must rise above their roles as  
5 advocates and attempt to resolve the differences without court intervention.<sup>105</sup> Deposition  
6 disputes requiring court intervention should therefore be extremely rare.  
7

8 On those rare occasions where there is a deposition dispute, counsel must attempt to  
9 resolve the dispute without court intervention. If counsel violates this Order, remind counsel of  
10 or provide counsel with a copy of this Order on the record. Counsel must exhaust all avenues  
11 to resolve a dispute that threatens the ability to proceed with a deposition. If offending counsel  
12 continues to behave inappropriately, consider taking a break to allow temperatures to cool and  
13 to have a private conversation between counsel to resolve the dispute.  
14

15 If reminding counsel of this Order does not change the inappropriate behavior, counsel  
16 must object on the record, identifying the specific inappropriate behavior or questioning. The  
17 “objection must be stated concisely, and in a non-argumentative and non-suggestive manner,”  
18 describing the improper conduct.<sup>106</sup>  
19

20 If counsel are still unable to resolve the dispute, counsel should preserve the dispute on  
21 the record for later resolution by the parties or the Court but finish the examination as to all  
22 other topics before suspending or terminating the deposition for the purpose of seeking  
23 protection from the Court.  
24

25 **B. Contacting the Discovery Commissioner During a Deposition**

26 Only in rare circumstances where counsel are not able to resolve the matter despite  
27 reference to this Order, counsel may contact the discovery commissioner assigned to the matter  
28

1 during the deposition to obtain a ruling during or after a deposition. Resolution *during* a  
2 deposition promotes “the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of [the] action and  
3 proceeding”<sup>107</sup> and is preferred where practical to expensive and time-consuming motion  
4 practice. *Counsel must not treat the ability to call to the discovery commissioner as a*  
5 *substitute for a good faith attempt to resolve the matter consistent with this Order.*  
6

7       If *all counsel* agree, the discovery commissioner will take a call during a deposition (or  
8 accept an invitation to participate in a streamed video deposition) to resolve a dispute if  
9 available. Counsel should immediately inform the discovery commissioner if the call or video  
10 stream is “on the record”. Counsel should be prepared to explain the dispute, together with  
11 their efforts to resolve the same without court intervention. The discovery commissioner will  
12 make a ruling if possible. Where the discovery commissioner cannot determine that questions  
13 or behavior are inappropriate without reviewing the transcript, a motion and formal briefing  
14 may be required. If any party disagrees with the discovery commissioner’s ruling, counsel may  
15 submit a discovery commissioner’s Report and Recommendation within 14 days of the  
16 deposition dispute or the objection is waived. The parties may then avail themselves of the  
17 objection procedures allowed by NRCP 16.3(c).  
18  
19

20 ///

21 ///

22 ///

23 ///

24 ///

25 ///

26 ///

27 ///

28 ///



1           **C.       Filing a Motion Based on Deposition (Mis)Behavior**

2           As a prerequisite to filing a motion based on deposition behavior and/or a violation of  
3 this Order, counsel must provide the Court with a transcript or other proof consistent with  
4 EDCR 2.34 showing that counsel engaged in a meaningful, good faith meet and confer,  
5 including a fulsome discussion of each participant’s obligations under this Order.  
6

7  
8  
9   
10 **DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER**

  
11 **DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER**

12                                   **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

13                                   **Dated this 9th day of May, 2022**

14  
15   
16

17                                   **OCA 994 1719 D20E**  
18                                   **Linda Marie Bell**  
19                                   **District Court Judge**

20  
21 <sup>1</sup> Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure (“NRCP”), Rule 1.

22 <sup>2</sup> Much of the language in this Standard Order is patterned after or taken from similar orders from courts in other  
23 jurisdictions. While those orders are not credited everywhere, their contributions are noted and appreciated. Some  
24 of those orders include Standing Order: Depositions, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois; 2019  
25 Florida Handbook on Civil Discovery Practice; Guidelines For Civility In Litigation, Los Angeles Superior Court  
26 Local Rules Chapter Three, Civil Division, Appendix 3.A; Cuyahoga County, Ohio Common Pleas Court Local  
27 Rules, Rule 13.1 Deposition Conduct; Guidelines for Deposition Behavior, 16<sup>th</sup> Circuit for Jackson County,  
28 Missouri, Division 11; U.S. District Court, District of Utah Rule 30-1.

<sup>3</sup> NRPC, Rule 3.1.

<sup>4</sup> See NRCP 30(c)(1); see also FRCP 30 Advisory Committee Notes, 1993 Amendments; NRCP 30 Advisory  
Committee Notes, 2019 Amendments (the “amendments generally conform Rule 30 to FRCP 30”). While  
Advisory Committee notes are not binding on the Court, they explain the intent behind the rules and are nearly  
universally accorded great weight in interpreting the rules. *Horenkamp v. Van Winkle & Co., Inc.*, 402 F.3d 1129,  
1132 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2005) (internal quotation mark and citation omitted); see generally *3M Company v. Boulter*, 842  
F.Supp.2d 85, 96-101 (D. D.C. 2012).

<sup>5</sup> *Dunn v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.*, No. 2:12-CV-01660-GMN, 2013 WL 5940099, at \*2 (D. Nev. Nov. 1, 2013).

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

<sup>6</sup> NRCP 30 Advisory Committee Notes, 2019 Amendments.  
<sup>7</sup> See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) Rule 30 Advisory Committee Note, 2000 Amendments.  
<sup>8</sup> NRCP 30(b)(4).  
<sup>9</sup> *Okada v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.*, 131 Nev. 834, 359 P.3d 1106 (2015) (citing 8A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, *Federal Practice and Procedure* § 2112 (3d ed. 2010)).  
<sup>10</sup> *Id.*  
<sup>11</sup> *Id.*, 359 P.3d at 1111 (citing *Cadent Ltd. v. 3M Unitek Corp.*, 232 F.R.D. 625, 629 (C.D. Cal. 2005)).  
<sup>12</sup> *Id.*, 359 P.3d at 1112.  
<sup>13</sup> NRCP 26(b)(1); *V5 Techs. v. Switch, Ltd.*, 334 F.R.D. 306, 313 (D. Nev. 2019), *aff’d sub nom. V5 Techs., LLC v. Switch, LTD.*, No. 2:17-CV-2349-KJD-NJK, 2020 WL 1042515 (D. Nev. Mar. 3, 2020) (depositions are generally limited to questions that seek relevant information).  
<sup>14</sup> NRCP 30(d)(3)(A).  
<sup>15</sup> NRCP 30(d)(2).  
<sup>16</sup> NRCP 3.4  
<sup>17</sup> Excluding privileged *sub rosa* videos.  
<sup>18</sup> Family Division cases are governed by the provisions of NRCP 16.2 and NRCP 16.205, but similarly require disclosure of documents *prior* to deposition.  
<sup>19</sup> See FRCP 26(a) Advisory Committee Notes, 1993 Amendments; cited by *Sender v. Mann*, 225 F.R.D. 645, 650 (2004).  
<sup>20</sup> *Jackson v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc.*, 278 F.R.D. 586, 592 (D. Nev. 2011) (internal citations omitted). Emphasis in original.  
<sup>21</sup> *Haeger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.*, 813 F.3d 1233, 1237 n.1., 93 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1519, 16 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1659 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2016).  
<sup>22</sup> NRCP 34.  
<sup>23</sup> NRCP 45(a)(1)(A)(3).  
<sup>24</sup> NRCP 45(a)(4)(A).  
<sup>25</sup> NRCP 45(a)(4)(B)(ii).  
<sup>26</sup> NRCP 45(a)(4)(B)(iii).  
<sup>27</sup> NRCP 45(a)(4)(B)(iv).  
<sup>28</sup> NRCP 45(a)(4)(B); NRCP 26(c).  
<sup>29</sup> See *e.g., Perry v. Leeke*, 488 U.S. 272, 281, 109 S.Ct. 594, 600 (1989) (a witness has no right to consult with his lawyer while testifying).  
<sup>30</sup> *Coyote Springs Inv., LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of State ex rel. County of Clark*, 131 Nev. 140, 347 P.3d 267 (2015).  
<sup>31</sup> *Id.*, 131 Nev. at 149, 347 P.3d at 273 (2015)  
<sup>32</sup> *Id.*  
<sup>33</sup> *Id.*, 131 Nev. at 147, 347 P.3d at 272.  
<sup>34</sup> *Id.*  
<sup>35</sup> NRCP 37(a)(4).  
<sup>36</sup> *Id.*  
<sup>37</sup> NRCP 30(c)(2).  
<sup>38</sup> See *Rapaport v. Soffer*, No. 2:10-CV-935-MMD-RJJ, 2012 WL 6799742, at \*4 (D. Nev. Dec. 31, 2012).  
<sup>39</sup> Where the information sought is simple and within the expected knowledge of the deponent.  
<sup>40</sup> NRCP 30(d)(1); NRCP 37; *V5 Techs. v. Switch*, 334 F.R.D. at 313.  
<sup>41</sup> NRCP 32(b); see also NRS Chapter 49.  
<sup>42</sup> *In Re Stratosphere Corp. Securities Litigation*, 182 F.R.D. 614 (D. Nev. 1998).  
<sup>43</sup> NRCP 30(c)(2).  
<sup>44</sup> *Id.*  
<sup>45</sup> *Id.*; see also NRCP 30(d)(3)(A) (“At any time during a deposition, the deponent or a party may move to terminate or limit it on the ground that it is being conducted in bad faith or in a manner that unreasonably annoys, embarrasses, or oppresses the deponent or party.”)  
<sup>46</sup> NRCP 32(d)(3)(B).  
<sup>47</sup> NRCP 32(d)(3)(A).  
<sup>48</sup> *Id.*

DISCOVERY  
COMMISSIONER  
EIGHTH JUDICIAL  
DISTRICT COURT

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

<sup>49</sup> NRCP 32(d)(3)(B).

<sup>50</sup> *Id.*

<sup>51</sup> The shortcut version “Objection—Form” is often substituted for “Objection to the form of the question.”

<sup>52</sup> *Sec. Nat. Bank of Sioux City, Iowa v. Abbott Labs*, 299 F.R.D. 595, 596 (N.D. Iowa 2014), rev’d sub nom., *Sec. Nat. Bank of Sioux City, IA v. Day*, 800 F.3d 936 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2015).

<sup>53</sup> *Luangisa v. Interface Operations*, No. 2:11-CV-00951-RCJ, 2011 WL 6029880, at \*7 (D. Nev. Dec. 5, 2011) (internal citation omitted).

<sup>54</sup> Explain precisely and succinctly without argument what is ambiguous about the question (e.g. Ambiguous as to the term “X”).

<sup>55</sup> Explain precisely and succinctly without argument what is vague or unintelligible about the question (e.g. Vague as to the time”).

<sup>56</sup> *In re Stratosphere*, 182 F.R.D. at 618.

<sup>57</sup> *Id.*

<sup>58</sup> NRS 50.025; NRS 50.265.

<sup>59</sup> *In re Stratosphere*, 182 F.R.D. at 618.

<sup>60</sup> NRS 50.115(3).

<sup>61</sup> Amir Shachmurove, *Disruptions' Function: A Defense of (Some) Form Objections Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure*, 12 Seton Hall Circuit Rev. 161, 191 (2016).

<sup>62</sup> *Id.*

<sup>63</sup> An objection to relevance is “not waived by a failure to make the objection before or during the deposition, unless the ground for it might have been corrected at that time.” NRCP 32(d)(3)(A); NRCP 30(c)(2); NRCP 30(d)(3). Repeated irrelevant questioning that rise to the level of harassment or bad faith conduct may justify a protective order. *See In re Stratosphere*, 182 F.R.D. at 619; *See, e.g., Desert Valley Painting & Drywall v. United States*, 829 F. Supp. 2d 931, 939-40 (D. Nev. 2011). The mere fact that more than one, or even that a series of irrelevant questions is asked does not, by itself, constitute the annoyance or oppression contemplated by Rule (30)(d)(3). *Rivera v. Berg Elec. Corp.*, No. 2:08-CV-01176-PMP, 2010 WL 3002000, at \*2 (D. Nev. July 28, 2010).

<sup>64</sup> The question of hearsay is one of admissibility; therefore, objections to hearsay evidence are preserved for trial. NRS 51.065; NRCP 32(b).

<sup>65</sup> Obstructionist counsel inappropriately use this objection to coach witnesses that they should offer no new testimony besides what was already offered.

<sup>66</sup> NRS 52.235

<sup>67</sup> This objection goes to the admissibility of the testimony, not to the form of the question and is therefore preserved for trial. NRCP 32(b).

<sup>68</sup> A deposition is not a trail; therefore *nothing* is “in evidence” yet. *Garcia v. Clark*, 2012 WL 1232315 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2012); *but see In re Stratosphere*, 182 F.R.D. at 619 (“assumes facts not in evidence” is an appropriate objection as to the form).

<sup>69</sup> Weil & Brown, *Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial* (The Rutter Group 2017) ¶ 8:722.1.

<sup>70</sup> Coaching a witness at a deposition is inappropriate. *See generally Coyote Springs Inv., LLC*, 131 Nev. at 147, 347 P.3d at 272; *see also In re Stratosphere*, 182 F.R.D. at 621 (“What this Court, and the Federal Rules of Procedure seek to prevent is coaching the witness by telling the witness what to say or how to answer a specific question. We all want the witness’s answers . . .”)

<sup>71</sup> *Hall v. Clifton Precision*, 150 F.R.D. 525, 531 (E.D. Pa. 1993).

<sup>72</sup> *Olivarez v. Rebel Oil Company, et al.*, Discovery Commissioner Opinion #11 (April 2003) (internal citations omitted).

<sup>73</sup> *Mazzeo v. Gibbons*, No. 2:08-CV-01387, 2010 WL 3020021, at \*2 (D. Nev. July 27, 2010).

<sup>74</sup> *Standing Order: Depositions*, U.S. District Court for the Norther District of Illinois, <https://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/PrintContent.aspx?cmpid=1128> accessed March 15, 2022.

<sup>75</sup> NRCP 30(d)(2).

<sup>76</sup> *Id.*

<sup>77</sup> NRCP 30(c)(2).

<sup>78</sup> *See* NRCP 30(d)(2); NRCP 30(d)(3)(A); NRCP 26(c)(1) (the court may “issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression . . .”)

<sup>79</sup> *In re Stratosphere*, 182 F.R.D. at 622.

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

<sup>80</sup> NRCP 30(d)(2).

<sup>81</sup> See *Standing Order*, supra n. 74.

<sup>82</sup> NRCP 30(c)(2).

<sup>83</sup> *Great Am. Ins. Co. of New York v. Vegas Const. Co.*, 251 F.R.D. 534, 538 (D. Nev. 2008) (internal citations omitted).

<sup>84</sup> *Id.*

<sup>85</sup> NRCP 30(b)(6).

<sup>86</sup> *Reno v. W. Cab Co.*, Case No. 2:18-cv-00840-APG-NJK, 2020 WL 5902318, at \*2 (D. Nev. Aug. 31, 2020).

<sup>87</sup> FRCP 30 Advisory Committee Notes, 2020 Amendments.

<sup>88</sup> NRCP 26(g).

<sup>89</sup> *Prokosch v. Catalina Lighting, Inc.*, 193 F.R.D. 633, 638 (D. Minn. 2000).

<sup>90</sup> Wang, Joyce C., Lambrinos, Demetrius, and Murphy, Meredith L., *Speak for Yourself: The 30(b)(6) Deposition*, ABA (Sept. 19, 2019) (citing *McBride v. Medicalodges, Inc.*, 250 F.R.D. 581, 584 (D. Kan. 2008)).

<sup>91</sup> *Crawford v. Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp.*, 261 F.R.D. 34, 38 (S.D. N.Y. 2009).

<sup>92</sup> If a party learns through interrogatories or another discovery device that Ms. Smith is the person at an entity who has the most knowledge about a topic that is relevant and proportional to the needs of the case, the party may take Ms. Smith's deposition, but her testimony will not bind the entity unless the entity voluntarily produces her as its Rule 30(b)(6) designee.

<sup>93</sup> NRCP 30(b)(6).

<sup>94</sup> *Great Am. Ins. Co.*, 251 F.R.D. at 538 (internal citations omitted).

<sup>95</sup> *Id.* (Rule 30(b)(6) designee binds company regardless of designee's personal knowledge on the subject).

<sup>96</sup> *Id.* (internal citations omitted).

<sup>97</sup> *Id.* (internal citations omitted).

<sup>98</sup> *Id.*

<sup>99</sup> NRCP 30(a)(2)(A)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2)(A) Advisory Committee Notes, 1993 Amendments.

<sup>100</sup> FRCP 30(b)(6) Advisory Committee Notes, 2000 Amendments (emphasis added).

<sup>101</sup> *U.S. E.E.O.C. v. Caesars Entm't, Inc.*, 237 F.R.D. 428, 436 (D. Nev. 2006) (discussing the circumstances under which a protective order to Rule 30(b)(6) topics may be appropriate); *Beach Mart, Inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc.*, 302 F.R.D. 396, 406 (E.D. N.C. 2014) (the "proper procedure to object to a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice is not to serve objections on the opposing party, but to move for a protective order.").

<sup>102</sup> *Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. Flamingo Trails No. 7 Landscape Maint. Ass'n*, 316 F.R.D. 327, 336–37 (D. Nev. 2016) (citing *Pioche Mines Consol., Inc. v. Dolman*, 333 F.2d 257, 269 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1964) ("unless [the movant] has obtained a court order that postpones or dispenses with his duty to appear, that duty remains"); see also *In re Toys "R" Us–Delaware, Inc. Fair & Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) Litig.*, No. ML 08–1980 MMM (FMOx), 2010 WL 4942645, at \*3 & n. 2 (C.D. Cal. July 29, 2010) (failure to attend deposition was unexcused despite the pendency of a motion for protective order)).

<sup>103</sup> NRCP 30(c)(2).

<sup>104</sup> *U.S. E.E.O.C. v. Caesars Ent., Inc.*, 237 F.R.D. 428, 433 (D. Nev. 2006) (internal citations omitted).

<sup>105</sup> *Luangisa*, 2011 WL 6029880, at \*6 (D. Nev. Dec. 5, 2011) (internal citations omitted).

<sup>106</sup> NRCP 30(d)(1).

<sup>107</sup> NRCP 1.