In Nevada, a claim for civil conspiracy requires: (1) two or more parties; (2) acting in concert; (3) with an intent to accomplish an unlawful objective for the purpose of harming another; and (4) damages. Consolidated Generator-Nevada Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 114 Nev. 1304, 1311, 917 P.2d 1251, 1256 (1998). When alleging civil conspiracy between corporations, one must plead and prove that agent(s) of each corporation involved acted outside their employment and personally became a conspirator.
A conspiracy consists of an unlawful combination of two or more persons to do that which is contrary to law, or to do that which is wrongful and harmful towards another person. Carlton v. Manuel, 64 Nev. 570, 586, 187 P.2d 558 (1947). To prevail in a civil conspiracy action, a plaintiff must prove an agreement between the tortfeasors, whether explicit or tacit. Eikelberger v. Tolotti, 96 Nev. 525, 528, 611 P.2d 1086, 1088 (1980). Proof of an agreement alone is not sufficient, however, because it is essential that the conduct of each tortfeasor be in itself tortious. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 876 (1979). As such, the Plaintiff must at least allege the defendants acted in consort to commit acts they knew to be unlawful. See Jordan v. State, 121 Nev. 44, 75, 110 P.3d 30 (2005).
Under the Intracorporate Conspiracy doctrine, members of a corporation, such as officers or employees, cannot be held to have conspired among themselves, because the corporation and its agents constitute a single actor for purposes of law. Therefore, the plurality of actors requirement needed to constitute a conspiracy is not satisfied. “Agents and employees of a corporation cannot conspire with their corporate principal or employer where they act in their official capacity on behalf of the corporation not as individuals for their individual advantage.” Collins v. Union Federal Savings and Loan Association, 99 Nev. 284, 304, 662 P.2d 610, 622 (1983).
“[I]n order to sustain a claim for civil conspiracy for agents of a corporation are involved, it is necessary to show that one or more of the agents acted outside of the scope of their employment to render them a separate “person” for purposes of the conspiracy.” Faulkner v. Arkansas Children’s Hospital, 69 S.W. 3d, 393, 407 (Ark. 2002). Thus, it is incumbent upon the Plaintiff to allege sufficient facts that corporations which are alleged to be agents of one another received “a benefit wholly separable from the more general and indirect corporate benefit always present under the circumstances surrounding virtually any alleged corporate conspiracy.” Seleman v. Am. Sports Underwriters Inc., 697, F. Supp. 225, 239 (W. D. VA 1988). See also Trau-Med of Am. Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 71 SW 3d 691, 704 (Tenn. 2002) (affirming dismissal of a conspiracy claim and noting “in this case, the plaintiff does not even intimate much less expressly allege in the complaint that the corporate agents involved in conspiratorial conduct were acting outside the scope of their employment or that they were pursuing their own personal objectives”).