Archive for: November, 2018

Pursuant to Article 6, Section 4 of the Nevada Constitution: “[t]he court shall also have power to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto, and habeas corpus and also all writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.” NRS 34.160 provides that “[t]he writ [of mandamus] may be issued by the Supreme Court … to compel the performance of an act which the law especially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station …” For more than a century, the Supreme Court has interpreted Nevada’s constitutional and statutory law to vest original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus.  See State v. Dist. Ct., 116 Nev. 127, 994 P.2d 692 (2000) (citing State ex rel. Curtis v. McCollough, 3 Nev. 202 (1867)).  Thus, the court has the constitutional and statutory authority to issue a writ of mandamus when, in the court’s discretion, circumstances warrant.

A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of an act which the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or to control a manifest abuse of discretion.  See Beazer Homes, Nev., Inc. v. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 575, 97 P.3d 1132, 1135 (2004); NRS 34.160.)  An abuse of discretion occurs if the district court’s decision is arbitrary and capricious or if it exceeds the bounds of law or reason.  Crawford v. State, 121 P.3d 582, 585 (Nev. 2005) (citation omitted). “Abuse of discretion” is defined as the failure to exercise a sound, reasonable, and legal discretion.  State v. Draper, 27 P.2d 39, 50 (Utah 1933) (citations omitted).  “Abuse of discretion” is a strict legal term indicating that the appellate court is of the opinion that there was a commission of an error of law by the trial court.  Id.  It does not imply intentional wrongdoing or bad faith, or misconduct, nor any reflection on the judge but refers to the clearly erroneous conclusion and judgment – one that is clearly against logic.  Id. (more…)

Rule 12(f) provides that a court “may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “[M]otions to strike should not be granted unless it is clear that the matter to be stricken could have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the litigation.” Colaprico v. Sun Microsys., Inc., 758 F. Supp. 1335, 1339 (N.D. Cal. 1991).

“Courts will not grant motions to strike unless ‘convinced that there are no questions of fact, that any questions of law are clear and not in dispute, and that under no set of circumstances could the claim or defense succeed.’”  Novick v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of America, 570 F.Supp.2d 1207, 1208 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (quoting RDF Media Ltd. v. Fox Broad. Co., 372 F. Supp. 2d 556, 561 (C.D. Cal. 2005)).  “When ruling on a motion to strike, this Court ‘must view the pleading under attack in the light most favorable to the pleader.” Id. (citing RDF Media Ltd., 372 F. Supp. 2d at 561).  “Motions to strike apply only to pleadings, and courts are unwilling to construe the rule broadly and refuse to strike motions, briefs, objections, affidavits, or exhibits attached thereto.” Foley v. Pont, No. 11cv1769-ECR-VCF, 2013 WL 782856, at *4 (D. Nev. Mar. 1, 2013); Caldwell v. Smith, No. 94-3066-CO, 1995 WL 555080, at *1 (D. Or. Sept. 1, 1995) (denying motion to strike since motion to dismiss is not a pleading). (more…)

What Constitutes Admissible Evidence

Under Rule 56?

Nevada law provides requires that all fact presented to a court by motion must be by sworn testimony.  Further, “[a]ffidavits/declarations must contain only factual, evidentiary matter, conform to the requirements of NRCP 56(e), and avoid mere general conclusions or argument.”  EDCR 2.21(c).  NRCP 56(e) requires “[s]upporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.”

The first requirement of Rule 56(e) is that the sworn testimony must be made upon personal knowledge.  See generally Saka v. Sahara–Nevada Corp., 92 Nev. 703, 705, 558 P.2d 535, 536 (1976) (recognizing that affidavits must be based on “the affiant’s personal knowledge, and there must be an affirmative showing of his competency (more…)

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